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A new era of European Integration?  
Governance of labour market and social policy since the sovereign debt crisis  
Caroline de la Porte and Elke Heins 
1. Introduction: The European Union and social policy   
The European Union (EU) aims to safeguard and promote high social standards across the EU, but 
respecting welfare state diversity (Scharpf, 2002). Since the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was 
institutionalised in 1992, the EU intervenes indirectly - as a functional spill-over from monetary 
integration - in social and fiscal policy. Concretely, it does so through the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), that is, a process of policy coordination with EU benchmarks and policies, national reports and EU 
surveillance as well as corrective mechanisms in case of deviation from these aims. Most important in 
this initial institutional architecture are the limits for public debt (maximum 60 per cent of GDP) and 
budget deficits (maximum 3 per cent of GDP). As social spending makes up the biggest share of public 
expenditure in Member States (more than half of total government expenditure was devoted to the 
functions ‘social protection’ and ‘health’ between 2002 and 2012 according to Eurostat figures), the 
pressure on national welfare states exerted by the SGP is therefore considerable, especially during 
economic recessions. 
The core actors involved in EMU governance are economically-oriented, that is DG ECFIN, and the 
Council for Economic and Financial Affairs as well as the European Central Bank (ECB). These actors are 
all concerned with upholding the monetarist paradigm, and with it supply-side policies, such as labour 
market de-regulation as well as cost containment in areas such as pensions and health care (Barbier, 
2012; de la Porte and Pochet, 2014; Scharpf, 2011). The SGP and the monetarist paradigm which 
underpins it, has not been without criticism. McNamara (2005: 156) notes, ‘Although the SGP has the 
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word ‘growth’ in its title, it is not likely to promote growth, but rather to be excessively restrictive at 
precisely the times that European states may need to stimulate their economies, as states are more 
likely to run up deficits in economic recessions.’  
In the mid-1990s and as a response to the EMU and the functional spill-overs on (pressure to decrease) 
social expenditure, the development of a ‘social dimension’ to the EU was seen as indispensable by left-
of-centre political actors. The notion of a ‘European Social Model’ represents the idea that European 
welfare states are legitimately diverse, but that they all aim to uphold high social standards, working 
conditions and well-being, which should be supported by the EU (Jepsen and Serrano Pascual, 2005). In 
core welfare state areas, where Member States face similar challenges, such as unemployment, ageing 
populations and new social risks, the EU has promoted various ideas, for example ‘flexicurity’ (Viebrock 
and Clasen, 2009), ‘active ageing’, or a ‘lifecourse’ approach to labour market participation - facilitating 
breaks from the labour market for education, parenting, and care responsibilities without potential loss 
of job.  
 
These policy ideas, many of them central in the emerging ‘social investment’ paradigm (Morel et al, 
2012) have been promoted through the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), thereby contributing to the development of the ‘European Social Model’, although 
only through voluntary policy coordination. These policies have been promoted by ‘socially-oriented 
actors’, that is, DG Employment and Social Affairs and the Employment and Social Affairs Council. 
Compared to the ’economically-oriented actors’ they have a weak legal basis for influencing welfare 
state reforms. Indeed, all decisions about the organisation, financing and delivery of social security have 
thus far remained at national level. While some countries have adopted common EU policy ideas 
through the OMC, its overall impact on welfare reforms has been weak (de la Porte and Pochet, 2012).  
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However, even the Treaty-based and thus much more enforceable SGP had its limitations. In the 
asymmetrical architecture of the EMU, monetary policy is pooled at EU level, while fiscal policy remains 
uncomfortably caught between EU and national level through EU pressure to curb public finances, but 
without direct or formal EU competency in this area (McNamara, 2005; Scharpf, 2002). While some 
Member States did undertake substantial reforms to comply with the Maastricht criteria prior to the 
2007 financial crisis (see, for example, Hassenteufel et al, 2000; Jessoula, 2012), the SGP was not 
sufficient to keep all countries within the set limits (De Haan et al, 2004; McNamara, 2005). When the 
2007 global financial crisis laid bare the asymmetries within the Eurozone and problems with the SGP’s 
enforcement, this led to an incremental alteration of instruments and policies that affect welfare state 
reform, both indirectly, via the architecture of the EMU, especially regarding fiscal policy, and directly, 
aiming to affect welfare policy per se.  
 
In this article, we analyse how the instruments developed in response to the crisis have altered the 
existing EU institutional framework with regard to labour market and social policy. In the next section, 
we develop the analytical framework, consisting firstly of a typology for detecting changes in EU 
integration and involvement and secondly, of a clarification of concepts to analyse institutional change. 
In section three, we analyse how new instruments have been developed since the onset of the crisis that 
affect the EMU and the social dimension. First, we analyse the development of instruments in the 
governance of fiscal and budgetary policy. We find that they have become more precise in terms of 
objectives, and stricter in terms of surveillance and enforcement, and that new instruments have been 
grafted onto existing institutional frameworks through a process of layering. Thereafter, we analyse the 
development of instruments more directly aimed at social and labour market policy. The findings show 
that the new initiatives have been layered onto the existing foundation in Europe 2020, but that they 
are weak in terms of surveillance and enforcement. This signifies that their potential impact is weak 
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compared to the instruments governing policy via the EMU. In section four, we analyse the implications 
of the findings for European social policy. Overall, we find that the alteration of the EMU governance 
framework with its pressure on fiscal consolidation, and as a side-kick the Social investment strategy 
developed in a weaker framework, penetrate deeper into welfare state policies than before the crisis. 
Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the significance of the new EU governance instruments for welfare 
states and the process of European Integration.  
 
2.  Analytical framework for analysing alterations in EU integration in labour market and social policy 
 
In this section, we develop a typology of ‘EU integration’ to analyse the main new instruments since the 
crisis and their significance for labour market and social policy along three dimensions: objectives (policy 
aims), surveillance process, and mechanisms of enforcement. For each, there are four possible degrees 
of EU involvement (from low to very high). Furthermore, a transversal issue we consider is the balance 
of actors involved, in devising policy objectives, and in the surveillance and enforcement processes. We 
argue that including employment and social policy actors (or other issue-specific actors) within a policy 
process provides a more comprehensive approach, for example, considering economic but also social 
sustainability aims, compared to processes driven exclusively or mainly by actors in economic and 
financial affairs, which are more narrowly focused on aims of fiscal consolidation. Secondly, to render 
this analysis dynamic and longitudinal, we analyse how these instruments and policies have altered the 
EU institutional framework governing economic, labour market and social policy over time, with the use 
of four key concepts from the literature on incremental institutional change:  layering refers to creating 
a new policy grafted onto an existing institutional framework; revision refers to the formal reform,  
replacement or elimination of existing policy; policy drift refers to the altered effect of a policy due to 
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changed circumstances, and conversion refers to redirection of an existing policy framework for new 
purposesi (Hacker, 2004).  
 
- - Table 1 here - - 
 
The first dimension of integration is objectives (policy aims), that is, how precisely and to which 
magnitude policy change is suggested, which is a first indicator of the depth of EU involvement in 
Member States’ social and employment policy, where EU competencies are marginal. We consider EU 
involvement as low if no change in objectives is required, but only minor changes to existing policies are 
suggested. Medium EU involvement would be indicated by more alterations, but without changing the 
institutional set-up. High (and very high) levels of involvement signify alterations with the potential for 
undermining the existing institutional structure and fundamental principles of a policy area, thus 
indicating a high amount of external pressure. Some objectives, such as adjusting the levels of pension 
benefits, would represent a medium level of EU involvement, as it does not signify new principles of 
organising pensions policy, but just an alteration within an existing institutional set-up. A policy aim such 
as enhancing social sustainability of pension systems would imply low involvement unless this aim were 
accompanied  by specific measures, while a policy aim suggesting reform of the existing pension system 
would signify high or very high EU involvement. In practice, and as we know from research on 
Europeanisation of welfare policies, any policy objective would have a differentiated effect in Member 
States depending on a wide range of issues in the domestic arena, such as ideas, politics and markets. 
For example, in familialistic welfare states the promotion of formal childcare policies (such as targets for 
the number of children in early childhood education) may be seen as high EU involvement because it 
challenges the existing male-breadwinner/female carer model and demands a significant change in 
policy objectives. In the Nordic welfare states, by contrast, such a policy merely confirms or re-enforces 
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the existing policy paradigm that supports the reconciliation of work with family life and EU involvement 
would thus be low. However, it is necessary to consider not only domestic factors and the institutional 
fit with EU policy objectives, but also which type of EU surveillance and enforcement they are exposed 
to.  
The second dimension of EU involvement is thus the surveillance of national policy by EU actors, which 
addresses with which mechanism the EU is endowed to monitor whether Member States are 
implementing the agreed policies and moving towards EU benchmarks and/or national targets. The 
strength of surveillance is indicated by the frequency of policy monitoring and on whether the basis for 
surveillance is soft or hard law. It is also important to take account of which EU actors are involved in a 
particular surveillance process. Some EU actors, namely the economic and financial actors, operate in 
areas where the EU has strong jurisdiction so that these actors have more power than others, such as 
the employment and social affairs actors, where the EU has only weak legislative competence.  
 
The third dimension of EU involvement is enforcement, referring to the type of measures EU actors have 
at their disposal to ensure implementation and/or corrective action in the case of non-compliance with 
or deviation from EU policy. The most coercive form consists of financial sanctions, although they have 
never been levied. Another form of enforcement consists of delineating a reform path and timetable to 
be followed in order to achieve an EU benchmark or aim in an ‘excessive deficit procedure’ (EDP) or 
‘country specific recommendation’ (CSR). This may alter an institution in different ways depending on 
the specificity of objectives and how it fits with the existing institution. An EDP is Treaty-based and 
designed to ensure that a country effectively corrects a deficit, while a recommendation under an OMC 
is merely a suggestion for reform, with no consequences in the case of non-compliance. In assessing 
enforcement, it is important to take account of the power balance between European institutions and 
Member States. In particular, the requirement of a qualified majority vote (QMV) gives more leverage to 
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Member States, since a qualified majority of Member States must agree to impose a sanction. By 
contrast, a reverse qualified majority vote (RQMV) gives more power to the European Commission, 
because a qualified majority of Member States would need to agree not to impose a sanction. Up to 
present, it is a mechanism which functions as a threat, as it has never been applied. A very high level of 
enforcement, combined with very strict surveillance, occurs in the case of countries that are under EU 
bail-out and have to subject themselves to rigorous conditionality as a consequence of loan receipt in 
Memorandums of Understanding  (see Theodoropoulou, this issue). In such cases, very specific policy 
objectives, a very high degree of surveillance as well as enforcement, lead to ‘intrusiveness’ in domestic 
settings. This particular type of EU involvement would be captured by the last column of our typology 
(see table 1 above). 
 
3. Analysing governance of social and labour market policy since the crisis 
This section begins with presenting the European Semester within which all new instruments are 
embedded and layered onto existing institutional foundations (see figure 1 below).  
- Figure 1 here - 
 
The ‘European Semester’ is a cycle of economic and fiscal policy coordination within the EU, agreed in 
2010 which aims to increase coherence and effectiveness of economic and social policies. It is launched 
yearly by the European Commission via an ‘Annual Growth Survey’ (AGS) that assesses progress of the 
past year and sets out EU growth and job creation priorities for the coming year (European Commission, 
2013c). ii The European Semester, and in particular the AGS, is very powerful for the agenda-setting 
process as it gathers all policy aims, instruments and actors involved in economic, social and labour 
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market policy. Furthermore, it is used to forward proposals for further strengthening the institutional 
architecture of the EU (European Council, 2011).  
3.1. Altering the governance of EMU since 2010 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 introducing EMU pooled monetary policy at EU level, while fiscal policy 
remained at national level. The 3 per cent budget deficit criterion was closely monitored and in the 
event of its breach by a Member State, an EDP could be launched. In the EDP, a plan was devised 
between the Member State and the Commission in order to exit the EDP, which could include reforms in 
pensions, health care or education. However, in 2005, this process was altered to take account of public 
investments. This rule change was controversial as it was put forward in the context on non-compliance 
with SGP criteria by France and Germany which pointed to a politicization and thus weakening of the 
process. In essence, however, the initial institutional architecture was not altered. Prior to the financial 
crisis of 2008, surveillance and enforcement of the SGP was medium, while the policy aims were highly 
specified (de la Porte and Heins, 2014). After 2010, when the Euro was under threat, the EU instruments 
governing EMU and the oversight of Member States’ budgets were reformed. The Six-Pack, the FC and 
the Two-Pack have altered the institutional framework radically, but through a process of institutional 
layering rather than a revision of the existing framework. 
 
3.1.1. Six-Pack 
In December 2011, the ‘Six-Pack’iii was adopted to increase the strength and scope of surveillance of all 
Member State economies with some specific rules for Eurozone Member States, especially regarding 
financial sanctions. The Six-Pack introduces several novelties which enhance European integration 
regarding fiscal and macro-economic policy in terms of precision of objectives, mechanisms of 
surveillance as well as enforcement.  
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First, with regard to specifying and monitoring fiscal consolidation, Member States’ budget balance shall 
converge towards country-specific medium-term objectives (MTOs). Also, country-specific structural 
balances are specified: they can range from a structural budget deficit of 1 per cent of GDP to a budget 
in surplus. These MTOs embody a high degree of surveillance compared to the situation before the 
crisis. The structural budget deficit is a new benchmark that has been added on to the original provisions 
in the Maastricht Treaty. The structural deficit, together with the 3 per cent budget deficit, is seen as 
more accurate than the budget deficit criterion alone as it aims to filter out temporary fiscal measures 
and evolutions that are due to cyclical changes in the economy (Verhelst, 2012). This preventative 
approach aims to keep Member State economies healthy in good times, rather than accumulating high 
deficits, and represents tighter integrated EU-Member State surveillance of budgets, by making them 
accountable to their own MTOs. Furthermore, enforcement is high: the Commission can issue a warning 
to a Member State in case of significant deviation from its own adjustment path defined in the MTO. 
National governments may thus have less leverage in defining (or rather differentiating) their national 
political agendas (including welfare state reforms), due to the MTO, and the structural budget deficit, 
which constrains their budgets and thus plans for expansive fiscal spending, such as in social and labour 
market policy (European Commission, 2013b).  
A second novelty of the Six-Pack is the ‘Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’ (MIP) with accompanying 
indicators that is more far-ranging than the focus on public finances as under the original SGP. In 2012, 
eleven indicators were selected for a scoreboard by DG ECFIN for monitoring the health of Member 
States’ economies, including private debt, nominal unit labour costs and unemployment. This tool has 
enhanced the surveillance capability of the European Commission towards Member States. Although the 
Commission will take account of country-specific circumstances, the scoreboard represents a tool to 
quantitatively assess national economies. It can lead to ‘Alert Mechanism Reports’ (AMR), i.e. in-depth 
reviews suggesting corrective action to ensure the health of national economies. In the first AMR, 12 
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Member States were subject to in-depth review, while in the second, 14 Member States were subject to 
in-depth review (European Commission, 2012b).   
 
Third, the Six-Pack increases enforcement of the SGP in case of non-compliance since an EDP can be 
launched if Member States have breached either the deficit or the debt criterion, where previously only 
the deficit criterion was operational. Concerning enforcement, an EDP is launched, like before the crisis, 
through QMV in the Council. The level of enforcement is therefore only medium in this respect. 
However, in contrast to the situation before the crisis, the punitive aspect of enforcement has become 
very high for countries not complying with the correction of the deficits or debts according to their 
plans. Indeed, if no effective action has been taken, quasi-automatic sanctions will be applied that could 
only be blocked by reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) in the Council. This means that a qualified 
majority of Member States (in Ecofin) must be against a Commission (DG ECFIN) proposal for a sanction 
to be overturned. This represents a high level of enforcement. If the EU Council is satisfied with the 
implemented measures to counter the fiscal imbalance following the sanction, then the deposit can be 
returned  (Van Aken and Artige, 2013). This measure is accompanied by a high degree of surveillance to 
verify that agreed measures to correct the imbalance are carried out.  
In sum, fiscal consolidation objectives are highly specified and EU influence can be assessed as 
potentially high on this dimension as national governments have less leverage in defining (or rather 
differentiating) their national policy agendas (including welfare state reforms) due to the budget-
restraining MTOs. The Six-Pack embodies a more tightened and thus high degree of integration on the 
surveillance dimension compared to the situation before the crisis as a broader range of the economy is 
considered in the surveillance of Member State budgets through the MIP. In addition, with the new 
structural budget deficit criteria a new benchmark has been added to the 3 per cent budget deficit 
criterion of the original Maastricht Treaty. Finally, the Six-Pack increases the enforcement of the SGP in 
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case of non-compliance since an EDP can be launched if Member States have breached either the deficit 
or the debt criterion, where previously only the deficit criterion was decisive. The Six-Pack thus 
introduces benchmarks, mechanisms and processes through which to improve the plausibility of 
meeting the fiscal consolidation aims of the EMU and of preventing future crises. This has an indirect but 
strong spill-over on welfare policy, to which a large part of public expenditure is devoted.  
3.1.2. Fiscal Compact  
The Fiscal Compact, added in 2012, is another legislative initiative that strengthens the aim of fiscal 
consolidation, together with surveillance and enforcement measuresiv. It complements and further 
reinforces the SGP by including an automatic correction mechanism in the case of significant deviations 
from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it and strengthens the automaticity of the EDP. It is 
binding for all euro area Member States, while other Member States will be bound once they adopt the 
euro or, upon their discretion, earlier and with the possibility to choose the provisions they wish to 
comply with (European Parliament and European Council, 2011). 
The Fiscal Compact specifies the rules for curtailing public debt in case that the limit of 60 per cent of 
GDP is exceeded.v It also requires that Member States converge towards country-specific MTOs with a 
limit of 0.5 per cent of GDP on structural deficits, also coined the ‘golden rule’ (Verhelst, 2012). This can 
be extended to 1 per cent for Eurozone countries with a debt ratio significantly below 60% of GDP. 
Economists expect future MTOs to converge towards the 0.5per cent benchmark, which should be 
integrated in Member State constitutions because it would force Eurozone countries to have balanced 
budgets in good times, which would render the likelihood of more than 3 per cent deficits less likely in 
economic downturns (Verhelst, 2012). There is some flexibility, since the golden rule can be temporarily 
disregarded in exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, the structural deficits enshrined in both the Six-
Pack and the Fiscal Compact imply a high degree of enforcement and represent a further step in 
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European integration by imposing Eurozone-fiscal discipline. However, even economists are concerned 
about the stringency of the golden rule, since it ‘risks obstructing public investments that address long-
term challenges such as ageing and the shift towards a green economy. It seems therefore preferable 
that the implementation of the golden rule considers public investments. If not, Eurozone countries will, 
perhaps sensibly, be inclined to circumvent their golden rule’ (Verhelst, 2012: 3). In the case of 
circumventing the norms laid down by the Fiscal Compact, the ECJ can impose financial sanctions of up 
to 0.1 per cent of GDP in case of non-compliance, which reinforces the corrective enforcement (ECB, 
2012: 83).  
Another novelty is that Member States must report on their national debt issuance to the Commission 
and the Council. This entails the expectation to discuss ex ante ‘all major policy reforms’, which suggests 
that it is negotiable bi-laterally with each Member State, taking due account of circumstances. The FC 
strengthens the enforcement mechanism of the SGP, since all stages of the EDP should be implemented 
within a clearly defined time frame. When the Commission considers that an excessive deficit exists, this 
decision can only be overturned by RQMV. The Fiscal Compact thus strengthens the decision-making 
capacity of the Commission (compared to the Six-Pack) and reduces the political discretion of the EU 
Council due to RQMV. The measures for exiting an EDP and the timetable are negotiated between the 
Commission and the Member State, as was the case in the original SGP. Thus, there is some room for 
negotiation although the threat of bad credit-ratings from international rating agencies culminating in a 
sovereign debt crisis may incite Member States to follow reform paths developed with the Commission 
more closely (see contributions in this issue; de la Porte and Natali, 2014). 
The Fiscal Compact, focused on fiscal discipline, builds on the Six-Pack, but makes the aims with regard 
to structural deficits even more stringent. Surveillance is high as Member States must discuss major 
reforms with the European institutions prior to their adoption. Ultimately, it reduces Member States’ 
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room for manoeuvre with regard not only to fiscal consolidation, but also structural reforms, such as in 
health care, pensions and labour markets. Moreover, the Fiscal Compact requires Member States to 
include the country-specific MTOs in national binding law, preferably at constitutional level. The 
instrument represents yet another initiative layered onto an existing institutional framework, rather 
than revision, since none of the previous instruments are replaced.   
3.1.3. Two-pack   
The Two-Pack, which came into force in May 2013, is a third initiative that has been layered onto the 
existent instruments governing the EMU (European Commission, 2013b). It specifies objectives in 
budgetary policy, together with high enforcement and surveillance mechanismsvi. Its novelty is to have 
introduced a common budgetary timeline and rules for all euro area countries. The Two-Pack has a 
significant impact on ‘sovereign’ budgets - the basis for policy making - as it requires Member States to 
send their budget proposals first for approval to the Commission and the Eurogroup, before they are 
submitted to national parliaments.  
The fact that national budgets, and thus details of (welfare) policy reforms, are the object of close 
scrutiny with strong potential for the EU to intervene in reform plans implies that euro area countries 
are now developing budgets in the shadow of EU surveillance. The Commission and the Eurogroup in 
their first assessment of Eurozone countries’ Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs)vii have concluded that only 
two countries were ‘compliant’, three were ‘compliant without any margin for possible slippage’, three 
were ‘broadly compliant’ with ‘some deviation from the adjustment path towards the MTO’, and five 
were in the category ‘at the risk of non-compliance’. On this basis, recommendations were made to 
these countries. It is only in the case of ‘particularly serious non-compliance’ that the Commission may 
request a revision of the draft budgetary plan. It remains to be seen, how effective enforcement will be, 
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and how precisely the Commission could require alterations in national budgets. Still, it represents much 
more interference in Member State budgets compared to before the crisis.  
3.2. Altering the governance of the European Social Dimension since 2010 
In this section, we discuss how social policy aims and instruments per se have been altered in the wake 
of the crisis and what this signifies for the European Social dimension. The coordination of European 
social and labour market policy was coordinated in the EES and various OMCs that have been 
institutionalised in the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 with the aim to achieve high levels of employment in 
combination with high levels of social protection. Pre-crisis, EU influence on setting policy objectives was 
medium, while the surveillance and enforcement of measures were low because the Lisbon Strategy 
was governed by the OMC (de la Porte and Heins, 2014). The Lisbon Strategy has been replaced (an 
instance of revision from the perspective of institutional change) by Europe 2020, with many of the 
same mechanisms, a few institutional innovations and a reinforcement of many aims, but with weak 
mechanisms of surveillance and enforcement. 
3.2.1 Europe 2020 
In June 2010, a new ten-year growth strategy coined ‘Europe 2020’ replaced the Lisbon Strategy as the 
main social and labour market policy instrument at European level (European Commission, 2010b). Like 
the new instruments governing EMU, Europe 2020 firstly insists on fiscal consolidation in the crisis 
context. Beyond that, it is designed to deliver growth, if possible, socially and environmentally 
sustainable growth, requiring immediate investments, but to pay off later in terms of economic growth, 
as well as social well-being and equality as well as a greener environment. However, this strategy is 
dependent on significant government expenditure which governments encumbered by a high public 
debt are hardly able to provide.  
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Europe 2020 is organised around five EU Headline Targets, which are supported by ten ‘Integrated 
Guidelines’ covering economic, environmental, employment and social issues, and seven ‘flagship 
initiatives’, the latter being novel institutional innovations. The policies adopted in these areas are to be 
reported in ‘National Reform Programmes’ (NRPs). Concerning the policy objectives, two of the 
Integrated Guidelines are devoted to employment policy, and one to social exclusion, while there are no 
targets or guidelines for social protection issues. The aim to increase labour market participation stands 
stronger than ever – the previous benchmark of an average overall employment rate of 70 per cent was 
raised to 75 per cent (European Commission, 2010b). The ‘Agenda for new skills and jobs’ is the flagship 
initiative that aims at supporting this aim, but also at ensuring workers are skilled and adaptable to the 
altering aims on the labour market. Concrete proposals of this agenda are to improve flexicurity, to 
equip the work force with appropriate skills for the modern labour market, to improve job quality and 
working conditions, and, finally, to improve job creation. Employment subsidies or targeted reductions 
of non-wage labour costs as well as the promotion of self-employment – arguably of precarious 
character in the context of a crisis - are among the suggested measures for job creation (European 
Commission, 2010a). These policies are by and large the same as those developed under the preceding 
Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010).  
The social aim consists of promoting social inclusion, intimately linked to increasing labour market 
participation, and combating poverty. Under Europe 2020 Member States have committed to ‘lift at 
least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and exclusion’ by 2020 (European Council, 2011). 
Member States have to specify their own national targets in this area. These targets are not very 
ambitious, which suggests a lack of real political will to take the EU target seriously (de la Porte and 
Weishaupt, 2013). Another flagship initiative - the ‘European platform against poverty and social 
exclusion’- supports the social exclusion aim of the EU. The degree of EU involvement regarding the 
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Europe 2020 objectives is low for poverty reduction, while it is medium for objectives such as activation 
and raising employment rates.  
EU surveillance of Europe 2020 is medium, as it takes place ex-post as part of an iterative policy cycle, 
now coordinated in the European Semester. On the basis of the NRPs, CSRs  are be made to Member 
States, suggesting policies to be adopted for reaching the broad policy aims delineated in Europe 2020. 
Enforcement of the CSRs is low as the adoption of the suggested measures is voluntary. Existing 
evidence on CSRs on employment policies shows that they have at times been sources of inspiration for 
reform (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012). However, overall impact is low, particularly under conditions 
of fiscal constraint and low growth.  
3.2.2 The Euro-plus Pact (EPP) 
The EPP, adopted in March 2011, is based on the OMC between the 17 Eurozone members and six other 
countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania). Aiming at better economic policy 
co-ordination, it  focuses on competitiveness, employment and financial sustainability, including a 
structured discussion on tax policy issues. It is a new initiative that has been layered onto the existing EU 
institutional framework.  The EPP specifies objectives that primarily fall in areas which are under the 
competence of the Member States including wage monitoring, labour market reforms, tax reforms, 
pensions, health care and social benefits, fiscal rules and banking regulations.  
In labour market policy, some objectives touch upon core labour market issues, including decentralizing 
wage-setting agreements as well as revising wage indexation mechanisms (Barnard, 2012). The EPP 
penetrates into sensitive national welfare state issues, specifying objectives to a high degree. It is 
integrated into the European Semester, where Member States should report on progress made towards 
the main aims: surveillance is medium through analysis of progress made to issues that are central in the 
EPP, alongside the assessment of progress made in other processes. The EPP is voluntary, using the 
OMC, and surveillance as well as enforcement is therefore as low as it is for Europe 2020. While each 
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Member State has the discretion to select their own national measures to achieve the common goals, 
and to decide how far-reaching reforms should be, national commitments should be integrated in the 
NRPs that are central for Europe 2020 and Stability or Convergence Programmes in the framework of 
the SGP. The Commission then assesses implementation by Member States of ‘Euro-Plus Pact 
commitments’ together with the assessment of other CSRs. Compared to the new institutional 
architecture around the EMU and even Europe 2020 with its headline targets and flagship initiatives, the 
EPP objectives are not likely to make headway via an OMC process, since they require domestic political 
commitment. 
 
3.2.3. Social Investment Package (SIP) and Youth Guarantee 
Social investment is a comprehensive paradigmatic approach that emphasizes the need to invest in 
individuals and their skills throughout the life-course so that they can participate in the labour market 
and combine this with other priorities, such as care responsibilities (European Commission, 2013d). It 
implies investing in institutions for early childhood, schools, vocational training, upper tertiary 
education, activation and life-long learning (see Morel et al, 2012). At the same time, temporary leave 
from the labour market should be facilitated without loss of job. Social investment ideas build on the 
foundations of the universalist welfare state, which is developed to meet these aims (see Kvist in this 
issue).  
Social investment, especially since a 2013 Commission Communication on the topic, provides an 
overarching policy framework to coordinate policy developed in economic, labour market and social 
policy. Member States can receive CSRs in the area of social investment through Europe 2020 (Euroepan 
Commission, 2013d).  What differentiates it from the social OMCs and the EES is that funding, especially 
from the ESF, is intended to be better integrated with the SIP for the 2014-2020 period (European 
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Commission, 2014). However, the EES was also combined with European funding and even where 
funding was linked to the EES aims, such as in the central and eastern European countries, the overall 
impact was weak (de la Porte and Jacobsson, 2012). Policy objectives are defined to a medium degree, 
while enforcement and surveillance are both weak, although they are medium if co-funding is included 
in pursuing an aim under the SIP. 
Parallel to the launching of the SIP, an initiative coined ‘Youth Guarantee’ was launched in April 2013 via 
a Council Recommendation, due to the concern about youth unemployment. It was another instrument 
layered onto the existing Europe 2020 framework. The guarantee aims to ensures that all young people 
under 25 get a good-quality, concrete offer within 4 months of them leaving formal education or 
becoming unemployed. This is a specific policy objective, and is coherent with the supply-side aims of 
monetarism and also with the main gist of social investment. The purpose of it is to avoid the inactivity 
trap among young people, particularly those not in education, employment, or training, as this could 
have consequences for their future. The Youth Guarantee strengthens the aim to activate young people, 
which was part of the EES already from the mid-1990s. Member State progress in this area is reported in 
‘National Youth Implementation Plans’ which have started to be reported in 2014. What is different 
compared to the EES that also focused on youth is that 6 billion Euros have been reserved in the ‘Youth 
Employment Initiative’ for the implementation of the guarantee across Member States (co-funded with 
Member States). If the initiatives are co-funded, then surveillance and enforcement will be medium; 
otherwise, they are low.   
4. Assessing the institutional alterations of EMU and the European Social Dimension 
Altogether, the Six-Pack, the Fiscal Compact and the Two-Pack have incrementally, and in rapid 
succession, been grafted onto the existing institutional framework to achieve aims of fiscal consolidation 
and balanced budgets already present in the Maastricht Treaty. Although their overall aims are not 
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novel, they represent a major leap forward in EMU integration due to new benchmarks requiring fiscal 
restraint, combined with high levels of surveillance and monitoring. Through these new instruments, 
especially the monitoring of Member State budgets as well as reporting on structural reforms, Member 
States are under pressure to curtail expenditure in health care, pensions, early childhood programmes 
and elderly care. The AGSs highlight the need to keep public expenditure growth below the rate of 
medium-term GDP trends and to correct macro-economic imbalances, to decrease account deficits as 
well as levels of indebtedness (European Commission, 2011, 2012a, 2013a, 2014). The necessary 
resources to facilitate investment in human capabilities and to facilitate participation of women on the 
labour market, key elements in a sustainable social investment strategy, may not be prioritised or could 
be under-resourced.  
Europe 2020, the main instrument to foster the European Social Dimension, has aimed to address the 
social and other non-monetary aspects of EMU and the EU. However, Europe 2020 and the instruments 
grafted onto it, in particular the SIP, are developed under the monetarist paradigm. Thus, instruments 
addressing social consequences of the crisis, for example the Youth Guarantee, frame policy responses 
that lean on supply-side policies. This was the case before the crisis as well, but the instruments and 
aims for fiscal consolidation, structural reforms and structural deficits were not nearly as constraining, 
effectively allowing for legitimate diversity. Now, the possibilities for diversity have become more 
limited through the framework and aims around fiscal and budgetary constraint.  
 
However, since the immediate effects of the crisis are receding, social aims that are not only at the 
service of EMU are taking shape: Member States are encouraged to introduce more open-ended 
contracts to replace existing temporary or precarious contracts in order to improve employment 
perspectives for new recruits and to flexibilise conditions for open-ended contracts in order to reduce 
rigidities on the labour market. Furthermore, there is a renewed emphasis on the need to develop 
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childcare institutions in order to facilitate the entry of second earners onto the labour market (European 
Commission, 2014). However, the resources available from the EU are very limited, which means that 
Member States need first to have balanced budgets and healthy economies to be able to make such 
investments. One possible institutional alteration would be to consider such investments as productive 
in the institutional architecture around EMU, if Europe is to improve and to maintain its social model. 
Table 2 below summarizes our findings with regard to the typology on EU integration and involvement, 
which shows that since the crisis, the EU has been much more involved in fiscal policy, a core issue for 
welfare states, but via the framework created for governing the Eurozone. It also shows that while there 
have been multiple initiatives integrated into and layered onto Europe 2020, these are governed by 
relatively weak instruments and processes, thus affecting welfare state reform through voluntarism 
only.  
 -- Table 2 here - - 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Since 2010, multiple new instruments have been created in the EU that affect welfare reform to an 
unprecedented degree. First, new instruments and policies have been grafted onto the existing 
institutional architecture to enhance the coordination of fiscal policy. The new norms, such as structural 
deficit rules as well as stricter enforcement and ex-ante surveillance of Member State budgets can be 
seen as a logical consequence of having more integration in monetary policy. These new norms have a 
significant impact on welfare states, as tight budgetary criteria will make expansionary public spending 
difficult even in healthy economies, let alone in crisis-ridden countries. The new instruments were 
agreed in unusually rapid succession in the context of an ongoing Eurozone crisis, leading to 
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considerable institutional change in the EMU architecture in a short period of time. The resultant 
institutional architecture holds Member States accountable to the EU ex-ante and ex-post with regard to 
their budgets and public expenditure, including social expenditure. 
Europe 2020, the instrument designed to coordinate employment and social policy and further develop 
the European Social Model, is comparatively weak compared to the sharpened objectives, surveillance 
and enforcement mechanisms in EMU. Although fostering social investment is on top of the EU social 
policy agenda, the extremely strict fiscal discipline and balanced budget rules which are highly 
institutionalised risk undermining the implementation of Europe 2020, that is now framed by the social 
investment.  
In the current situation, what is needed in order to ensure a life-course approach to labour market 
participation, with a highly skilled labour force together with economic growth is social investment. This 
requires financing in the short-term in order to reap benefits in the future and the long-term, such as for 
example alternative forms of taxation and co-funding from the ESF, although the effect of this is likely to 
be limited. The risks of missing the opportunity to develop social investment and to develop only a 
limited supply-side and liberal agenda is particularly high in countries that are still struggling not only 
with the effects of the crisis, but also with lack of institutions geared to make social investment 
sustainable - starting with institutions for early childhood education and care, through kindergartens, 
schools, higher education and life-long learning. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that EMU criteria  
and the new instruments developed for fiscal consolidation should be altered to take account of 
investments made in such institutions, if the social investment strategy is not to be more than an 
unattainable ambition.   
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i
 In the framework developed by Hacker (2004) each type of change is associated with the types of political 
dynamics (coalitions and veto players) underlying possible type of change. In this article, we merely use the 
concepts to assess and to illustrate what types of changes have taken place in the European economic and social 
governance processes, without considering the political dynamics behind it. 
ii Through the AGS, the EU Spring Council in March issues guidance covering fiscal, macroeconomic 
structural reform and growth enhancement for national policies on the basis of QMV. The policy 
priorities decided in the AGS should be included in Member States’ Stability or Convergence 
programmes (concerning monetary policy) devised within the SGP, and in National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) concerning economic, employment and social policies devised within Europe 2020 that are to be 
submitted in April. Finally, the Commission proposes Country Specific Recommendations, which are then 
to be adopted/altered by the Council before the summer. 
iii The legislation consists of these six parts: (1) strengthening surveillance of budgetary positions and 
coordination of economic policies, (2) acceleration and clarification of the EDP through a Council 
regulation, (3) enforcement of  budgetary surveillance in the euro area through a regulation, (4) 
definition of a budgetary framework of the MS through a Directive, (5) prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances through a regulation, (6) enforcement of measures for correcting excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.. 
iv The Fiscal Compact was signed in March 2012 by all EU members except the United Kingdom and the 
Czech Republic and is the fiscal part of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). 
v The difference between the actual ratio and SGP limit shall be reduced by an average rate of one 
twentieth per year as a benchmark. 
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vi The Two-Pack consists of two regulations (based on Art 136 TFEU) complementing the Six-Pack in euro 
area countries to improve the transparency and coordination of Member States' budgetary planning and 
decision-making processes (European Commission, 2013b). 
vii  Applicable to those countries that are not under a macroeconomic adjustment programme. 
